This paper is about Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs. The main ingredients of Spohn's theory are (i) a functional representation of an epistemic state called a disbelief function, and (ii) a rule for revising this function in light of new information. The main contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we provide a new axiomatic definition of an epistemic state and study some of its properties. Second, we study some properties of an alternative functional representation of an epistemic state called a Spohnian belief function. Third, we state a rule for combining disbelief functions that is mathematically equivalent to Spohn's belief revision rule. Whereas Spohn's rule is defined in terms of the initial epistemic state and some features of the final epistemic state, the rule of combination is defined in terms of the initial epistemic state and the incremental epistemic state representing the information gained. Fourth, we state a rule of subtraction that allows one to recover the addendum epistemic state from the initial and final epistemic states. Fifth, we study some properties of our rule of combination. One distinct advantage of our rule of combination is that besides belief revision, it also can be used to describe an initial epistemic state for many variables when this information is given as several independent epistemic states each involving few variables. Another advantage of our reformulation is that we can show that Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs shares the essential abstract features of probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. One implication of this is that we have a ready-made algorithm for propagating disbelief functions using only local computation.
Introduction
This paper is about Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs (Spohn 1988 (Spohn , 1988b ). Spohn's theory is an elegant, simple and powerful calculus designed to represent and reason with plain human beliefs.
The motivation behind Spohn's theory is the need for (i) a formalism to represent plain epistemic belief and (ii) procedures for revising beliefs when new information is obtained. As Spohn (1988b, p. 315) notes, probability theory is inadequate for this purpose because of several reasons. I believe A is true cannot be represented by P(A) = 1 because probability of 1 is incorrigible, i.e., P(A|B) = 1 for all B such that P(A|B) is well defined. However, plain belief is clearly corrigible. I may believe it is snowing outside but when I look out the window and observe that it has stopped snowing, I now believe that it is not snowing outside. Nor can we represent I believe A is true with P(A) ≥ 1−ε, say, where ε≥0 is some small number because as per the notion of plain belief, if I believe A is true and I believe B is true, then I believe A and B is true.
However, if P(A) ≥ 1−ε and P(B) ≥ 1−ε, then it is not necessary that P(A and B) ≥ 1−ε. The Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions (Dempster 1968 , Shafer 1976 ) suffers from the same problems. Once we assume Bel(A) = 1, no further evidence will reduce belief in A to less than 1.
The main ingredients of Spohn's theory are (i) a functional representation of an epistemic state called a natural (or ordinal) conditional function, and (ii) a rule for revising this function in light of new information. Since the values of a natural conditional function represent degrees of disbeliefs, we call such a function a disbelief function. Like a probability distribution function, a disbelief function for a variable is completely specified by its values for the singleton subsets of configurations of the variable. Spohn (1988b, pp. 318-320) has interpreted the values of a disbelief function as infinitesimal probabilities (see also (Pearl 1989) ). Smets (private communication) and Dubois and Prade (1990) has pointed out that a disbelief function can be interpreted as the negative of the logarithm of a possibility function as studied by, e.g., Zadeh (1978) and Dubois and Prade (1988) .
The main contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we provide an axiomatic definition of a consistent epistemic state. Some of the axioms we propose are different from the ones proposed by Spohn. Our axioms are a little easier to understand, but we show that the two sets of axioms are mathematically equivalent. These axioms are also found in (Gardenfors, 1988) .
Second, we study some properties of an alternative functional representation of a consistent epistemic state called a Spohnian belief function. Although the definition is stated in (Spohn 1988) , there is not much else in there about this function. We state several properties of belief functions. When compared to disbelief functions, belief functions are easier to interpret.
But since they contain redundant information, they are harder to manipulate mathematically.
Third, we state a rule of combination for disbelief functions that is mathematically equivalent to Spohn's belief revision rule. Whereas Spohn's rule is defined in terms of the initial epistemic state and some features of the final epistemic state, the rule of combination is defined in terms of the initial epistemic state and the incremental epistemic state representing the information gained. The rule of combination for disbelief functions is pointwise addition.
Fourth, we state a rule of subtraction that always allows one to recover the addendum epistemic state from the initial and final epistemic states. This rule is useful in cases where information gained is expressed in terms of the final epistemic state as it allows us to recover the addendum epistemic state that is combined with the initial to obtain the final. The subtraction rule is also useful for non-monotonic reasoning when it becomes necessary to retract the conclusion of an earlier inference without influencing conclusions drawn using other means.
The rule of subtraction for disbelief functions is pointwise subtraction.
Fifth, we study some properties of our rule of combination. Spohn's belief revision rule is formulated to revise an epistemic state in light of new information. On the other hand, the rule of combination described in this paper is more flexible. It also can be used to describe an initial epistemic state for many variables when this information is provided as several independent epistemic states each involving few variables. The initial epistemic state for all variables is then obtained by combining these independent epistemic states using the rule of combination. This is a distinct advantage of our reformulation of Spohn's belief revision rule.
Another advantage of our reformulation is that we can show that Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs shares the essential abstract features of probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions as described in Shenoy and Shafer (1988, 1988b) . These features are (i) a functional representation of knowledge (or beliefs), (ii) a rule of marginalization, and (iii) a rule of combination. In Shenoy and Shafer (1988, 1988b) , we also state three axioms for the marginalization and combination rules that enable one to use local computation in the calculation of the marginals of a joint function without explicitly having to compute the joint function. In this paper we show that the rules of marginalization and combination for disbelief functions satisfy the required three axioms. One implication of this is that we have a ready-made algorithm for propagating disbelief functions using only local computation as described in detail in Shenoy and Shafer (1988b) .
An outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide an axiomatic definition of a consistent epistemic state and study some of its properties.
In Section 3, we introduce the notation. We use the multivariate framework and we restrict ourselves to the finite case: the number of variables is finite and each variable has a finite frame. Our motivation here is easier comprehension.
In Section 4, we define disbelief functions and the marginalization operation. Most of the material in this section is due to Spohn. In Section 5, we define and study some properties of an alternative representation of a consistent epistemic state that we call a Spohnian belief function.
In Section 6, we state and describe Spohn's rules for revision of beliefs. Spohn has described two rules for belief revision called A,α-conditionalization and λ-conditionalization.
A,α-conditionalization is a special case of λ-conditionalization. Most of the material in this section is due to Spohn. In Section 7, we state a rule of combination for disbelief functions and then show that Spohn's A,α-conditionalization rule for belief revision can be expressed in terms of the rule of combination.
In Section 8, first, we state a rule of subtraction for disbelief functions. Second, given the final and the initial disbelief functions, we show that we can always subtract the latter from the former to recover the disbelief function that was added to the initial to obtain the final. Third, we show that Spohn's λ-conditionalization rule for belief revision and our rule of combination are mathematically equivalent.
In Section 9, first we state some elementary properties of the rule of combination.
Second, we illustrate how an initial disbelief function for many variables can be constructed by combining independent disbelief functions each of which is for few variables. We sketch what we mean by independent disbelief functions. Third, we show that the rules for marginalizing and combining disbelief functions satisfy the three axioms stated by Shenoy and Shafer (1988, 1988b) for computing marginals using local computation.
Finally, in Section 10, we conclude with a short discussion of what we have accomplished in this paper. Some terminology we use in this paper is different from that used by Spohn (1988 Spohn ( , 1988b Finally, we would like to mention that there is more to Spohn's theory than that discussed here. Analogous to the concept of conditional independence in probability theory, Spohn defines conditional independence with respect to disbelief functions and states many results regarding this concept (see also (Hunter 1988b) ). We strongly recommend the reader to read (Spohn 1988) to appreciate first-hand, the elegance, simplicity and power of Spohn's theory.
Consistent Epistemic States
In this section, we will define axiomatically a consistent epistemic state. Some of our axioms are different from those used by Spohn but the two sets of axioms are equivalent. Next, we describe a characterization of a consistent epistemic state due to Spohn.
Consider a variable X. Let w X denote a finite set of possible values of X such that exactly one is true. We shall call w X a frame for X. Assume further that w X is defined such that the propositions regarding X that are of interest are precisely those of the form 'The true value of X is in A' where A is a subset of w X . Thus the propositions regarding X that are of interest are in a one-to-one correspondence with the subsets of w X (Shafer 1976, p. 36) .
The correspondence between subsets and propositions is useful since it translates the logical notions of conjunction, disjunction, implication and negation into the set-theoretic notions of intersection, union, inclusion and complementation (Shafer 1976, pp. 36-37) . Thus, if A and B are two subsets of w X , and A' and B' are the corresponding propositions, then A∩B corresponds to the conjunction of A' and B', A∪B corresponds to the disjunction of A' and B', A⊆B if and only if A' implies B', and A is the set-theoretic complement of B with respect to w X (written as A = ~B) if and only if A' is the negation of B'. Notice also that the proposition that corresponds to ∅ is false and the proposition that corresponds to w X is true. If A is a proper, non-empty subset of w X , we shall call the proposition that corresponds to A as contingent.
Henceforth, we will simply refer to a proposition by its corresponding subset. The set of subsets of w X will be denoted by 2 w X .
In an epistemic state for X, some propositions are believed to be true (or simply, believed), some are believed to be false (or simply, disbelieved) and the remaining are neither believed nor disbelieved. Logical consistency requires that these beliefs satisfy certain conditions (axioms). A definition of a consistent epistemic state is as follows.
Definition 1. An epistemic state is said to be consistent if the following five axioms are satisfied:
A1. For any proposition A, exactly one of the following conditions holds:
A3. A is believed if and only if ~A is disbelieved.
A4. If A is believed and B⊇A, then B is believed.
A5. If A and B are believed, then A∩B is believed. ■ Some simple consequences of Definition 1 are as follows.
Proposition 1. The following conditions always hold in any consistent epistemic state:
A6. ∅ is (always) disbelieved.
A7. If A is disbelieved and B⊆A, then B is disbelieved.
A8. If A and B are disbelieved, then A∪B is disbelieved.
A9. If A is not believed, then this does not necessarily imply that ~A must be believed; it is possible that ~A is also not believed. And if A is not disbelieved, then this does not necessarily imply that ~A must be disbelieved; it is possible that ~A is also not disbelieved. A10. If b denotes the set of all believed propositions, then ∩b ≠ ∅.
A11. If b denotes the set of all believed propositions, then A∈b whenever A ⊇ (∩b') for some b' ⊆ b. Proof: A6 follows from A2 and A3. A7 follows from A4 and A3. A8 follows from A5 and A3.
To show that A9 is true, consider an epistemic state in which the only proposition that is believed is w, the only proposition that is disbelieved is ∅, and all other propositions are neither believed nor disbelieved. Clearly, this epistemic state satisfies axioms A1 to A5.
To show A10, note that by repeated application of A5, (∩b) ∈ b. And from A6, it follows that ∩b ≠ ∅.
Finally, to show A11, note that by repeated application of A5, (∩b')∈b, Proof: (Sufficiency) . Assume that the epistemic state is consistent. Consider the proposition ∩b. It follows from A10 that ∩b ≠ ∅. The sufficiency part of the proof follows by letting C = ∩b.
(Necessity). Suppose b = {A∈2 w X | A ⊇ C} for some non-empty subset C of w X . We will show that the epistemic state satisfies axioms A1 to A5. First note that A1 and A3 are satisfied by definition. To show A3, note that w X ⊇ C.
Therefore, w X ∈b, i.e., w X is believed. To show A4, suppose that A is believed and B ⊇ A. Since A is believed, A∈b. Therefore, A ⊇ C. Since B ⊇ A, B ⊇ C. Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 1 and axiom A3. Notice that D = ~C. ■
The characterization of b in Theorem 1 (but not Theorem 1 itself) is due to Spohn (1988, p. 108 ). Spohn defines a consistent epistemic state as one that satisfies A1, A3, A10 and A11, and consequently, Theorem 1 follows trivially from A10 and A11. It follows from Theorem 1 that our definition of a consistent epistemic state (axioms A1 to A5) is equivalent to Spohn's (A1, A3, A10 and A11).
Subset C in Theorem 1 is called the content of the consistent epistemic state. Note that the content constitutes a complete specification of an epistemic state. Thus another simple corollary of Theorem 1 is that in a frame w X consisting of n elements, there are exactly 2 n −1 distinct possible consistent epistemic states (corresponding to each non-empty subset of w as the content 
Variables, Configurations and Propositions
In this section, we introduce the notation that will be used in the rest of the paper. We use the multivariate framework because, even though it does not generalize readily to the continuous case, it is more intuitive and easier to comprehend than the measurable-subset framework used by Spohn (1988 Spohn ( , 1988b .
Consider a variable X. The symbol w X denotes the set of possible values of X. We assume that one and only one of the elements of w X can be the true value of X. We call w X the frame for X. For example, suppose we are interested in determining whether a person is a pacifist or not. We can construct a variable P whose frame has two elements: p (for pacifist), and ~p (not pacifist).
Let x denote the set of all variables. In this paper we will be concerned only with the case where x is finite. We will also assume that all the variables in x have finite frames.
We will often deal with non-empty subsets of variables in x. Given a non-empty subset g of x, let w g denote the Cartesian product of w X for X in g, i.e., w g = ×{w X | X∈g}. We can think of the set w g as the set of possible values of the joint variable g. Accordingly, we call w g the frame for g. Also, we will refer to elements of w g as configurations of g. We will use this terminology even when g consists of a single variable. Thus we will refer to elements of w X as configurations of X. We will use lower-case, bold-faced letters such as x, y, etc. to denote configurations. Also, if x is a configuration of g and y is a configuration of h and g∩h = ∅, then (x,y) will denote a configuration of g∪h.
Projection of configurations simply means dropping extra coordinates; if (r,~q,~p) is a configuration of {R,Q,P}, for example, then the projection of (r,~q,~p) to {R,P} is simply (r,~p), which is a configuration of {R,P}. If g and h are sets of variables, h⊆g, and x is a configuration of g, then we will let x ↓h denote the projection of x to h.
By extension of a subset of a frame to a subset of a larger frame, we mean a cylinder set extension. If g and h are sets of variables, h⊆g, and A is a subset of w h , then the extension of A to g is A×w g−h . We will let A ↑g denote the extension of A to g. For example, consider three variables R, P, Q with frames w R = {r, ~r}, w P = {p, ~p}, and w Q = {q, ~q}, respectively. Then the extension of {(r,~p), (~r,p)} (which is a subset of w {R,P} ) to {R,P,Q} is {(r,~p,q), (r,~p,~q), (~r,p,q), (~r,p,~q)}. Note that the propositions corresponding to A and A ↑g are logically equivalent.
We will denote the set of all natural numbers by N and the set of integers by Z; N = {0, 1, 2, ... } and Z = { ..., −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, ... }. The extended set of natural number consists of the set of all natural numbers to which a symbol, +∞, has been added with the following properties. If x∈N, then (i) x < +∞, and (ii) x + +∞ = +∞. The extended natural number set is denoted by N + .
Similarly, we will let Z + denote the extended set of integers consisting of set of all integers to which two symbols +∞ and -∞ have been added with the following properties. If x ∈ Z, then
Disbelief Functions
The basic functional representation of an epistemic state in Spohn's theory is called an ordinal conditional function in (Spohn 1988, p. 115 ) and a natural conditional function in (Spohn 1988b, p. 316) . We simply call this function a disbelief function.
Definition 2 (Spohn 1988b, p. 316) . A disbelief function for g is a function δ: A disbelief function consists of more than a representation of a consistent epistemic state.
It also includes degrees of belief and disbelief. If δ(A) > 0, then δ(A) can be interpreted as the degree of disbelief in proposition A, i.e., A is more disbelieved than B if δ(A) > δ(B) > 0. And if δ(~A) > 0, then δ(~A) can be interpreted as the degree of belief for A, i.e., A is more believed
Consider the following disbelief function for g: δ({w}) = 0 for all w∈w g . This means that the only proposition that is disbelieved is ∅ and the only proposition that is believed is w g .
We shall call such a disbelief function vacuous. It represents a state of complete ignorance.
Proposition 2 (Spohn 1988, p. 115 
Spohnian Belief Functions
As we saw in the last section, a disbelief function models degrees of disbeliefs for disbelieved propositions directly whereas it models degrees of beliefs for believed propositions only indirectly; if A is a believed proposition, then the degree of belief for A is δ(~A). Can we model both beliefs and disbeliefs directly? The answer is yes. We call such a representation a (Spohnian) belief function. However, as we shall see, belief functions are not as easy to manipulate mathematically as disbelief functions. This is because, a belief function has redundant information: If we believe proposition A to degree α, then we must disbelieve ~A to degree α. Including both these statements in the definition of a disbelief function is the main cause of the difficulty. Nevertheless, the ease of interpretation of a belief function makes its study worthwhile.
Definition 4 (Spohn 1988, p. 116) . A (Spohnian) belief function for g is a func-
The number β(A) is interpreted as the degree of belief in proposition A. A is believed iff β(A) > 0, A is disbelieved iff β(A) < 0, and A is neither believed nor disbelieved iff β(A) = 0. Furthermore, if β(A) > β(B) > 0, then A is more believed than B, and if β(A) < β(B) < 0, then A is more disbelieved than B. Propositions ∅ and w g are the extreme cases. ∅ is the most disbelieved proposition (β(∅) = -∞) and w g is the most believed proposition (β(w g ) = +∞). Table 3 shows the corresponding belief function β. ■ The disbelief function that produces a given belief function is unique and can be recovered from the belief function:
Theorem 2. Suppose β is the belief function for g given by the disbelief function δ. Then 
B3. β(∅) = -∞, and β(w g ) = +∞. Proof: (Sufficiency) . Let β be a function satisfying conditions B0 to B3. To
show that β is a belief function, we need to construct a disbelief function δ such Since δ(∅) = +∞ > 0, we need to show that β(∅) = −δ(∅) = -∞. This is true from B3. Since δ(w g ) = 0, we need to show that β(w g ) = δ(~w g ) = δ(∅) = +∞. This is also true from B3. This completes the sufficiency part of the proof. The proof of B2 is similar to the proof in the sufficiency part. And B3 is obvious from condition D3 and Definition 4. ■ Notice that the proper subset D is the complement of the content of the consistent epistemic state represented by β. Thus a belief function is specified completely by its values for each configuration in D. Furthermore, from condition B2, it follows that a proposition is believed iff it contains the content, is disbelieved iff it is a subset of D, and is neither believed nor disbelieved otherwise. This is consistent with Theorem 1 and its corollary.
The following theorem describes marginalization for belief functions. Next consider the case x∈w h is such that δ ↓h ({x}) = 0. Then, β
Revision of Disbeliefs
In this section, first we state Spohn's A,α-conditionalization rule for modifying a disbelief function in light of new information. Then we describe four properties of this rule.
Finally, we describe the general λ-conditionalization rule.
Definition 5 (Spohn 1988, p. 117 
if w∉A for all w∈w g . Second, since learning about A (or ~A) does not discriminate between propositions contained in A, the relative degrees of disbelief of these propositions is unchanged, i.e., δ(E) − δ(E') = δ Α,α (E) − δ Α,α (E') for all E,E' ⊆ A. Also, since learning about A does not discriminate between propositions contained in ~A, the relative degrees of disbelief of these propositions is also unchanged. What has changed is that the degrees of disbelief of propositions contained in ~A have shifted upwards relative to propositions contained in A (Spohn 1988, p. 117 ).
Before we continue with the properties of the belief revision rule, let us illustrate the rule with an example. Suppose our initial epistemic state is as given by δ in Table 2 . Suppose after a brief conversation with the stranger, we now believe that the person is a republican to degree 3. In this case A = {(r,q,p), (r,q,~p), (r,~q,p), (r,~q,~p)}, α = 3, δ(A) = 0, and δ(~A) = 0. Then the revised disbelief function, denoted say by δ', is shown below in Table 4 . Note that as per our epistemic state δ', we now believe that the person is not a pacifist (to degree 1) and not a Quaker (to degree 1).
Suppose after further conversation with the stranger, we now believe that the person is a Quaker to degree 3. In this case, A = {(r,q,p), (r,q,~p), (~r,q,p), (~r,q,~p)}, α = 3, δ'(A) = 1, and δ'(~A) = 0. The revised disbelief function is denoted by δ'' and is also shown in Table 4 . As per the epistemic state δ'', we now believe that the person is a pacifist (to degree 1), a republican (to degree 2) and a Quaker (to degree 3). ■ 
Note that A and B satisfy the conditions required for commutativity, namely
Given what we learned from interviewing suspects x and y, the fact that we interviewed suspect x before suspect y has no bearing on the final epistemic state. ■ In Definition 5, a belief revision rule was stated in terms of a single proposition A that was believed to degree α. Spohn (1988b, p. 318) has generalized this definition to the case where the information gained may concern more than a single proposition. Spohn calls this general belief revision rule λ-conditionalization where λ is the marginal of the resulting disbelief function for some subset h of variables. Here is a formal definition.
Definition 6 (Spohn 1988b, p. 318) . Suppose δ is a disbelief function for g representing our initial epistemic state. Suppose we learn something about variables in set h that consequently leads us to an epistemic state represented by a disbelief function δ λ for g∪h such that δ λ ↓h = λ where λ is a disbelief function for h. Then the epistemic state δ λ , called the λ-conditionalization of δ, is defined as follows:
for all w∈w g−h , u∈w g∩h , v∈w h−g . ■ It is easy to show that δ λ is indeed a disbelief function. Furthermore, it is also obvious that δ λ ↓h = λ. Notice that A,α-conditionalization is a special case of λ-conditionalization where λ is a disbelief function for g such that λ({w}) = 0 if w∈A and λ({w}) = α if w∉A. As noted by Spohn (1988b, p. 318) , λ-conditionalization is the analogue of Jeffrey's rule in probability theory (Jeffrey 1983, Ch. 11 ).
Belief Revision As A Rule of Combination
In this section, first, we describe a rule of combination. Second, we show that Spohn's rule for modifying a disbelief function in light of new information can be expressed in terms of this rule of combination.
Definition 7 (A Rule of Combination).
Suppose δ 1 and δ 2 are disbelief functions for g 1 and g 2 , respectively. The combination of δ 1 and δ 2 , denoted by δ 1 ⊕δ 2 , is a disbelief function for g 1 ∪g 2 defined as follows:
■ K is a normalization factor that ensures that δ 1 ⊕δ 2 is a disbelief function. Thus, combination consists of pointwise addition followed by normalization.
We will now show that Spohn's rule for belief revision as described in the previous section can be expressed in terms of the rule of combination. Since β i ↓h (A) ≥ 0, we have δ i ↓h (A) = δ i (A ↑g ) = 0, and δ i (~A ↑g ) = β i (A ↑g ) = β i ↓h (A). Therefore, from Definition 5 we have:
Note that w∈A ↑g iff w ↓h ∈A, and w∉A ↑g iff w ↓h ∉A. From the definition of combination, clearly δ i ⊕δ Δ = δ f . Since δ i (A ↑g ) = 0, the normalization constant
In this case, whatever we have learned has resulted in an decrease of belief for A from degree β i ↓h (A) to degree α. Define the disbelief function δ Δ for h as follows:
Since β i ↓h (A) > 0, we have δ i ↓h (A) = δ i (A ↑g ) = 0, and δ i (~A ↑g ) = β i (A ↑g ) = β i ↓h (A) > 0. Therefore, from Definition 5, we have
We will now show that δ i ⊕δ Δ = δ f . Notice that since δ i (A ↑g ) = 0 and δ i (~A ↑g ) > 0, {w∈w g | δ i ({w}) = 0} ⊆ A ↑g . Therefore, after pointwise addition of δ i and δ Δ , the normalization constant K = β i ↓h (A) − α. From the definition of combination, we have:
for all w∈w g . Since K = β i ↓h (A) − α, we get the result.
In this case, whatever we have learned has resulted in an increase of belief for A. Define the disbelief function δ Δ for h as follows:
Therefore, from Definition 5, we have
We will now show that δ i ⊕δ Δ = δ f . First notice that after pointwise addition, the normalization constant K = −β i ↓h (A). This is because MIN{δ i ({w})|w∈A ↑g } =
Therefore, from the definition of combination we have:
for all w∈w g .
Thus in all three cases, which is an exhaustive list, belief revision reduces to the rule of combination. ■
In the next section we will show that our rule of combination and Spohn's λ-conditionalization are mathematically equivalent. But first we pause for a numerical example to illustrate Theorem 6. As per δ', we disbelieve {q} to degree 1. After the second body of evidence, we believe {q} to degree 3. Therefore, what we have learnt from the second body of evidence can be represented by disbelief function δ Δ '' for {Q} as follows: δ Δ ''({q}) = 0, and δ Δ ''({~q}) = 4. Notice that δ'' = δ'⊕δ Δ '' (the normalization constant in this combination is K = 1). ■
A Rule of Subtraction
In this section, first we define a rule of subtraction for disbelief functions. Second, we
show that we can always recover the incremental disbelief function from the final and initial disbelief functions. Third, we show the mathematical equivalence between Spohn's λconditionalization and our rule of combination.
Spohn's belief revision rules were described in terms of the initial disbelief function δ i and characteristics of the final disbelief function (proposition A and its degree of belief α in A,αconditionalization, and disbelief function λ in λ-conditionalization). On the other hand, the rule of combination describes the final disbelief function in terms of the initial disbelief function and the incremental disbelief function representing the evidence. If we are given the initial and the final disbelief function, can we always recover the incremental disbelief function? The answer is yes and is stated below as Theorem 7. First we need a definition.
Definition 8 (A Rule of Subtraction).
Suppose δ 1 is a disbelief function for g, suppose δ 2 is a disbelief function for h and suppose h⊆g. Then the subtraction of δ 2 from δ 1 , denoted by δ 1 −δ 2 , is a disbelief function on g given by
for all w∈w g , where K is a normalization constant given by
It is clear from the definition of the normalization constant K that δ 1 −δ 2 is a disbelief function. The next theorem states that we can recover the incremental disbelief function from the initial and final disbelief functions.
Theorem 7. Suppose δ i and δ Δ are disbelief function for g and h, respectively.
(since z ↓h = w for all z∈{w} ↑(g∪h) ).
The normalization constant K 1 in the subtraction operation simplifies as follows:
■ Corollary to Theorem 7. Suppose δ is a disbelief function for g, suppose δ Δ is a disbelief function for h, and suppose h⊆g. Then (δ−δ Δ )⊕δ Δ = δ. Proof: Suppose δ is a disbelief function for g, suppose δ Δ is a disbelief function for h, and suppose h⊆g. Let w∈w g−h , u∈w h . Then
As in the proof of Theorem 7, it is easy to show that K 1 = −K 2 . Hence the proof follows. ■
The following example illustrates the rule of subtraction.
Example 8. Consider the disbelief functions δ' and δ'' for {R,Q,P} from Example 4 reproduced in Table 5 below. Table 5 also shows the disbelief function δ'' − δ'.
The normalization constant in this case is K = −1. Also, notice that (δ''−δ') ↓{Q} is the same as δ Δ '' described in Example 7. ■ The property of disbelief functions of being always able to recover the addendum from the sum is unique to this theory and is not shared either by probability theory or by the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. This property is useful for two reasons. First, in cases where it is easier to describe evidence by reference to the final disbelief function, we can always recover the incremental belief function that represents just the evidence. Second, this property is useful in non-monotonic reasoning as it allows us to retract the conclusion of an earlier inference without influencing conclusions drawn using other means (see e.g., Ginsberg 1984) .
We now have the necessary tools to prove that Spohn's λ-conditionalization and our rule of combination are mathematically equivalent. 
Simplifying the second term on the right hand side we get
Therefore we have
The normalization constant K 1 in the combination operation simplifies as follows:
Therefore δ⊕δ Δ = δ λ .
(⇐) Suppose δ is a disbelief function for g and δ Δ is a disbelief function for h.
Define λ to be (δ⊕δ Δ ) ↓h . We need to show that the λ-conditionalization of δ is indeed δ⊕δ Δ . Let w∈w g−h , u∈w g∩h , and v∈w h−g . Then
Properties of the Combination Rule
In this section, we discuss several important properties of the combination rule described in Section 7. First, we state some elementary properties of the rule of combination. Second, we describe how the rule of combination can be used to construct a disbelief function for many variables from independent disbelief functions each of which only involves a few variables. We sketch what we mean by independent disbelief functions. Third, we show that Spohn's theory of disbelief functions fits in the same abstract framework as that for the theory of probability and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions.
First, we state some elementary properties of the rule of combination.
Proposition 3. The rule of combination described in (7.1) has the following properties:
C1. (Commutativity) δ 1 ⊕δ 2 = δ 2 ⊕δ 1 .
C2. (Associativity) (δ 1 ⊕δ 2 )⊕δ 3 = δ 1 ⊕(δ 2 ⊕δ 3 ).
C3. If δ 1 is vacuous, then δ 1 ⊕δ 2 = δ 2 .
C4. In general, δ 1 ⊕δ 1 ≠ δ 1 . The disbelief function δ 1 ⊕δ 1 disbelieves the same propositions as δ 1 , but it will do so with twice the degree, as it were. Proof: All four properties follow trivially from the definition of combination. ■ Note that although Spohn's belief revision rule is partially commutative, the rule of combination is always commutative. There is no conflict here. Spohn's belief revision rule is described in terms of the initial epistemic state and some features of the final epistemic state. On the other hand, the rule of combination describes belief revision in terms of the initial epistemic state and the epistemic state representing the evidence. Thus commutativity for Spohn's rule and commutativity for the rule of combination are two different relations. The following example illustrates this for the non-commutative belief revision case of Example 5.
Example 9. (Non-commutative belief revision as a commutative combination).
Consider the story of Example 5. The initial epistemic state for S is the vacuous disbelief function represented by δ 1 in Table 6 . Following the weather announcement, I now believe that it is snowing to degree 1. Using the rule of subtraction, the incremental epistemic state representing the weather announcement, denoted by δ 2 , is shown below in Table 6 . The current epistemic state is given by δ 1 ⊕δ 2 . After I look out the window, I now believe that it is not snowing to degree 1. Again, using the rule of subtraction, the incremental epistemic state repre-senting the evidence obtained from looking out the window, denoted by δ 3 , is shown in Table 6 . The final epistemic state is given by δ 1 ⊕δ 2 ⊕δ 3 . Note that δ 1 ⊕δ 2 ⊕δ 3 = δ 1 ⊕δ 3 ⊕δ 2 . ■ Second, the rule of combination is valid not only for belief revision but also for the construction of an initial disbelief function for many variables when this information is given in terms of independent disbelief functions each of which is for small number of variables. What do we mean by independent disbelief functions? Here, we will just sketch an answer by analogy with the theory of probability and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. A complete answer merits a separate paper.
By independent beliefs, we mean the same as in the theory of probability and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. In probability theory, beliefs are represented by functions called potentials and the rule of combination is pointwise multiplication (see, e.g., Shenoy and Shafer 1988, 1988b) . However, combining two potentials gives us meaningful results only when the potentials being combined are independent. For example, suppose we have two variables X and Y with frames {x, ~x} and {y, ~y}, respectively. Consider a potential p 1 = (p(x), p(~x)) for X, representing a (prior) probability distribution for X. Consider another potential p 2 = (p(y|x), p(~y|x), p(y|~x), p(~y|~x)) for {X,Y}, representing the conditional distributions for Y given X. In this case, the potentials p 1 and p 2 are independent. Combining these by pointwise multiplication, denoted by ⊗, gives us the joint potential p 1 ⊗p 2 for {X, Y} as follows: (p(y|x)p(x), p(~y|x)p(x), p(y|~x)p(~x), p(~y|~x)p(~x)). We recognize this potential as the joint probability distribution for {X, Y}. Consider another potential p 3 = (p(y), p(~y)) for Y representing a probability distribution of Y. In general, p 1 and p 3 are not independent. If we combine these two potentials, the result p 1 ⊗p 3 = (p(x)p(y), p(x)p(~y), p(~x)p(y), p(~x)p(~y)) does not necessarily representing pooling of evidence. We know from probability theory that p 1 ⊗p 3 represents combination of evidence if and only if X and Y are probabilistically independent, i.e., if and only if p 1 and p 3 are independent potentials.
In the Dempster-Shafer theory, Dempster's rule for combining belief functions represents pooling of evidence only when the belief functions being combined are independent. Shafer (1984, 1987) has described in detail precisely what is meant by independent belief functions in terms of canonical examples for belief functions. In fact, most of the examples that Pearl (1988, pp. 447-450) describes to show that application of Dempster's rule gives non-intuitive results do so precisely because the belief functions being combined are not independent.
Spohn's theory of disbelief functions is closely analogous to the theory of probability (see Spohn 1988b, pp. 318-320 for a comparison of his theory with probability theory).
Analogous to the concept of probabilistic conditional independence, Spohn (1988, pp. 120-125; 1988b , p. 318) has described conditional independence for disbelief functions. As in the probabilistic case, Hunter (1988b) has shown that the conditional independence relation for disbelief functions forms a "graphoid" (see e.g., (Geiger and Pearl 1988) or (Verma and Pearl 1988 ) for definition of a graphoid). Using the notion of conditional independence, we can define when two disbelief functions are independent by direct analogy with the theory of probability.
Example 10. (Construction of an initial disbelief function)
Consider two sets of beliefs as follows:
1. Most Republicans are not pacifists.
Most Quakers are pacifists.
Suppose further that these two sets of beliefs are independent. Then, if δ 1 is a disbelief representation of the first set of belief and δ 2 is a disbelief representation of the second set of belief, then δ 1 ⊕δ 2 will represent the aggregation of these two sets of beliefs. In particular, suppose δ 1 is a disbelief function for {R,P} as follows:
δ 1 ({(r,p)}) = 1, δ 1 ({(r,~p)}) = δ 1 ({(~r,p)}) = δ 1 ({(~r,~p)}) = 0 (i.e., we disbelieve pacifist republicans), and suppose δ 2 is a disbelief function for {Q,P} as follows: δ 2 ({(q,~p)}) = 2, δ 2 ({(q,p)}) = δ 2 ({(~q,p)}) = δ 2 ({(~q,~p)}) = 0 (i.e., we disbelieve non-pacifist Quakers). Then the disbelief function δ 1 ⊕δ 2 = δ, say, shown in Table 2 , represents the aggregate belief. Note that there is no belief revision going on here. Of course, Theorem 8 tells us that we can mathematically describe the aggregation of δ 1 and δ 2 using λ-conditionalization (λ is the same as δ 2 for this example). But in general, it is neither practical nor intuitive. ■ Third, as per our reformulation, Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs shares the essential abstract features of probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions as described in Shenoy and Shafer (1988, 1988b) . These features are (i) a functional representation of knowledge (or beliefs), (ii) a rule of marginalization, and (iii) a rule of combination. In Shenoy and Shafer (1988 and Shafer ( , 1988b , we also state three axioms for the marginalization and combination rules that enable one to use local computations in the calculation of the marginals of a joint disbelief function with explicitly having to compute the joint disbelief function. These three axioms are as follows (stated in the notation of disbelief functions):
L1. (Commutativity and Associativity of Combination). Suppose δ 1 , δ 2 and δ 3 are disbelief functions for g, h, and k respectively. Then, δ 1 ⊕δ 2 = δ 2 ⊕δ 1 , and (δ 1 ⊕δ 2 )⊕δ 3 = δ 1 ⊕(δ 2 ⊕δ 3 ).
L2. (Consonance of Marginalization). Suppose δ is a disbelief function for g and suppose k⊆h⊆g. Then (δ ↓h ) ↓k = δ ↓k .
L3. (Distributivity of Marginalization over Combination). Suppose δ 1 and δ 2 are disbelief functions for g and h, respectively. Then (δ 1 ⊕δ 2 ) ↓g = δ 1 ⊕(δ 2 ↓(g∩h) ).
We have already shown that axioms L1 and L2 are valid for disbelief functions.
Theorem 9 below states that axiom L3 is also satisfied.
Theorem 9. Suppose δ 1 and δ 2 are disbelief functions for g and h, respectively.
Then (δ 1 ⊕δ 2 ) ↓g = δ 1 ⊕(δ 2 ↓(g∩h) ).
Proof: Note that g∪h = (g−h)∪(g∩h)∪(h−g), g = (g−h)∪(g∩h), and h = (g∩h)∪(h−g). Suppose w∈w g−h , u∈w g∩h , and v∈w h−g . Then (w,u)∈w g , and (u,v)∈w h . First, note that the normalization factor in the combination on the lefthand side, say K 1 , is the same as the normalization factor in the combination on the right-hand side, say K 2 , i.e., K 1 = K 2 , as shown below. Since all three axioms required for local computation of marginals are satisfied, the scheme described in Shenoy and Shafer (1988b) can be used for belief updating. Hunter (1988) describes an analogous scheme for belief revision.
Discussion
In Shenoy (1989) , we describe a valuation-based language for representing and reasoning with knowledge. In such a language, knowledge is represented by functions called valuations and inferences are made from the knowledge-base using two operators called combination and marginalization. Combination corresponds to aggregation of knowledge and marginalization corresponds to crystallization of knowledge. Conceptually, all the valuations are combined to obtain what is called the joint valuation. The marginals of the joint valuation are then found for each variable. If combination and marginalization operators satisfy three axioms, then the marginals of the joint valuation can be found using local computation without actually computing the joint valuation. In Shenoy and Shafer (1988, 1988b) , we show that Bayesian probability theory and Dempster-Shafer's theory of belief functions fit in the abstract framework of valuation-based languages. In this paper, we have shown that Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs also fits in this abstract framework. One implication of this is that we have a ready-made algorithm for propagating disbelief functions that uses only local computation. Another implication is that we now have a better understanding of the sense in which Spohn's theory differs from probability theory and Dempster-Shafer's theory of belief functions (in the functional representation of knowledge, and rules of combination and marginalization), and the sense in which it is similar to these alternative theories of uncertain reasoning (the abstract features of the axiomatic framework).
